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TOWARD A PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD IN
SENTENCING: NICKENS V. STATE'
INTRODUCTION
The sentencing process has recently provoked increased in-
terest in the legal community.2 This development is no doubt the
result of an awareness that, because most defendants plead
guilty, 3 the critical stage in the criminal process is most often
sentencing. Although the due process revolution has resulted in
significant procedural safeguards for criminal defendants,4 the
sentencing decision has been left to the almost unfettered discre-
tion of trial judges.5 Indeed, one commentator has charged that
sentencing is an area of "lawlessness." 6 It has been recognized,
however, that due process applies at sentencing,7 but, unfortun-
ately, the question of what process is due has been largely unan-
swered.'
The primary value underlying the concept of due process of
law is the notion that a person faced with adverse governmental
action must be treated fairly.9 A fundamental requirement of
1. 17 Md. App. 284, 301 A.2d 49 (1973).
2. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS, APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES (Approved Draft,
1968); ABA STANDARDS, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURE (Approved Draft, 1968);
Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1972); Pugh & Carver, Due
Process and Sentencing: From Mapp to Mempa to McGautha, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 25 (1970);
Singer, Sending Men to Prison: Constitutional Aspects of the Burden of Proof and the
Doctrine of the Least Drastic Alternative as Applied to Sentencing Determinations, 58
CORNELL L. REV. 51 (1972).
3. The guilty-plea rate varies, depending on jurisdiction, from seventy to ninety per
cent. ABA STANDARDS, APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES 1 (Approved Draft, 1968).
4. For a brief chronicle of this revolution, see Canudo, Crime and the Constitution:
Have We Reached the Turning Point?, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 629 (1972). See also Amster-
dam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV.
785 (1970).
5. "There is no other area of law, except perhaps the civil commitment of the
mentally ill, where the lives of so many people are so drastically affected by officials who
exercise a virtually absolute, unreviewed discretion." Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and
the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View from Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1968),
commenting on the probation and sentencing processes.
6. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1972).
7. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
8. Cf. Pugh & Carver, Due Process and Sentencing: From Mapp to Mempa to
McGautha, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 25 (1970); Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentenc-
ing for Felony, 81 HAv. L. REV. 821 (1968).
9. With respect to the requirements of due process in the determination of guilt, it
has been said that the reviewing court must ascertain whether the proceedings "offend
those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-
speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses." Malinski v.
New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). It seems that, at the
very least, this statement should apply as well to the sentencing process.
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fairness in the sentencing context is that the sentencing decision
must be based on accurate information.'" Therefore, procedures
must be developed to insure that sentencing judges do not abuse
their discretion by using inaccurate information in making their
decisions.
This note will examine the Nickens decision, which, al-
though technically involving a narrow question of statutory con-
struction, may represent a step towards solving the problem of
establishing an accurate factual basis for the sentencing deci-
sion." An examination of both federal and Maryland precedent
will reveal that the Nickens holding is consistent with and, per-
haps, compelled by the dictates of due process. In addition, be-
cause the Nickens holding requires that hearsay offered at sen-
tencing must pass a reliability test similar to the test utilized
when search warrant applications rest on hearsay information,
the leading Supreme Court cases enunciating that test will be
discussed. Finally, the discussion will focus on the question of
whether the application of this search and seizure concept is ap-
propriate in the sentencing context.
The Nickens Decision
William Rhodes was convicted of possession of heroin with
intent to distribute, possession of controlled paraphernalia, main-
taining a dwelling house as a common nuisance, and maintaining
an automobile as a common nuisance." At the presentence hear-
ing, 3 the arresting officer testified that Rhodes was the number
two man in a narcotics organization spanning the city of Balti-
10. As will be discussed infra at notes 29-67 and accompanying text, this proposi-
tion finds ample support in the case law. In addition, the proposition seems self-evident:
A sentence-just as a conviction-based on inaccurate facts seems grossly unfair.
11. The implications, discussed infra at notes 29-50 and accompanying text, derive
from the court's indication that due process considerations were involved in its decision.
However, because the Nickens case could have been decided on purely statutory grounds
and because the court did not explain why due process considerations were involved,
Nickens could be narrowly interpreted in the future.
12. The conviction and sentence of co-appellant Nickens was affirmed. 17 Md. App.
at 285, 301 A.2d at 53.
Rhodes' nuisance convictions were reversed because the State had failed to produce
evidence demonstrating the recurring nature of the offenses. See Skinner v. State, 16 Md.
App. 166, 293 A.2d 828 (1972) (evidence that illegal drugs found on the day appellant's
automobile was searched held insufficient to support conviction for maintaining a com-
mon nuisance).
13. One writer has argued that there is a constitutional right to a sentencing hearing.
Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View from Mempa v.
Rhay, 47 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1968). However, the Supreme Court has not yet expressly held
that such a right exists.
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more and that he was a "bundle drop-off man'"" who made daily
deliveries to dealers. The officer said he had acquired this infor-
mation from his personal investigation, enhanced by his "street
knowledge,"'" and from numerous informants whose identity he
failed to disclose. He admitted that the reliability of some of the
informants had not been established, but he insisted that he
knew that the others were reliable. On cross-examination, he tes-
tified that he had followed Rhodes but had never seen him "drop
bundles." Moreover, the only time he had seen Rhodes with con-
traband had been at the time of the search of Rhodes' home and
automobile. Thus, the basis of the officer's allegations rested on
the information from his informants. The trial judge denied
Rhodes' motion to strike the testimony and set sentence at fifteen
years of imprisonment without indicating whether he had relied
on the officer's testimony in reaching this disposition.
On appeal Rhodes argued that the testimony was inadmissi-
ble under section 298(f) of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous
Substances Act.'6 This section provides, in part, that hearsay is
admissible in the sentencing of drug offenders "if the underlying
circumstances upon which it is based and the reliability of the
source of the information is demonstrated."" Appellant con-
tended that the close approximation of this statutory language to
the language contained in Spinelli v. United States's indicates
that hearsay must be scrutinized under standards identical to
those required in the search warrant situation." Arguing that the
In Maryland, there is no statutory right to a hearing. However, the case of Driver v.
State, 201 Md. 25, 92 A.2d 570 (1952), established the right of an offender to refute adverse
information. To this extent, then, Maryland recognizes the right to a hearing.
14. A "bundle drop-off man" is a drug pusher who delivers packages containing
twenty-five "bags," or single doses, to street-level heroin pushers. Telephone interview
with Thomas J. Bollinger, Assistant State's Attorney for the City of Baltimore and Direc-
tor of the Narcotics Strike Force, in Baltimore, Nov. 27, 1973.
15. 17 Md. App. at 288-89, 301 A.2d at 51.
16. The Act is codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 276-302 (1971).
17. Section 298(f) reads as follows:
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, at any hearing relating to
bail or sentencing arising out of any violation or alleged violation of any provision
of this subheading, hearsay evidence shall be admissible if relevant to the issue and
if the underlying circumstances upon which it is based and the reliability of the
source of the information is demonstrated.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 298(f) (1971) (emphasis added).
18. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
19. Brief for Appellants at 7, Nickens v. State, 17 Md. App. 284, 301 A.2d 49 (1973).
Although the brief did not refer to Spinelli by name, the citation of Dawson v. State, 14
Md. App. 18, 24, 284 A.2d 861, 864 (1971) (Moylan, J., concurring), the leading Maryland
interpretation of Spinelli, makes it clear that the appellants were urging the Spinelli
standards.
1974
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legislature had intended to relax evidentiary standards in the
sentencing of drug offenders, the State asserted that there had
been substantial compliance with the statute.'
Finding that section 298(f) "mandates the constitutional
protections" of the due process clause," and vacating the sen-
tence, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that the relia-
bility requirements of the statute had not been met and that, if
the trial judge had considered this testimony in making his deci-
sion, appellant had been denied due process. The court therefore
remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing.
The court's holding required that, to meet the statutory re-
quirements on remand, the testimony must pass a two-pronged
test consisting of a showing of informational reliability and source
credibility. Under this test, the mere conclusions of the witness
are insufficient; the statements made by the witness's informants
must be recited in order that the judge may determine if the
underlying circumstances demonstrate informational reliability.
Further, the witness must state facts which demonstrate his in-
formant's credibility. The court indicated, however, that the
credibility requirement is not necessarily as strict as that set forth
in Spinelli.2 Thus, although the court adopted a test with an
analytical framework identical to Spinelli, it apparently believed
that the application of that test should be somewhat different in
the sentencing context.
Use of Hearsay Before Nickens and Section 298(f)
In passing on the admissibility of the officer's testimony in
the instant case, the court did not refer to prior Maryland cases
but, instead, merely scrutinized the testimony according to the
20. Brief for Appellee at 7.
21. "It was not the intention of the Legislature to allow the sentencing judge to
consider all information . . . without regard to the source or trustworthiness of hearsay
presented. The enactment [section 298(f)] mandates the constitutional protections
... 17 Md. App. at 289, 301 A.2d at 52. It is from this statement that the implications
of the Nickens case, discussed infra at notes 29-67 and accompanying text, are derived.
Because the court did not explain why due process was involved here and because the case
could have been decided on purely statutory grounds, future cases might treat this state-
ment as pure dictum and thus deprive Nickens of a more expansive interpretation. How-
ever, as will be discussed infra at notes 36-67 and accompanying text, an examination of
prior federal and Maryland case law will reveal that the Nickens court was on solid ground
in making this comment.
22. "This is not to say that the credibility.requirements are necessarily as restrictive
as those required to establish probable cause in an ex parte proceeding. Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410." 17 Md. App. at 290, 301 A.2d at 52 (footnote omitted).
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statutory standards. Thus the question arises: Did section 298(f)
change Maryland law?
At first blush the enactment seems to be a codification of the
case law which authorizes the use of hearsay at sentencing. The
Maryland Court of Appeals sanctioned the use of hearsay in
Costello v. State,23 where the appellant challenged the trial
judge's use of unfavorable information regarding his marital life.
The wife had testified both prior to and after the reception of this
information that the appellant had been a good husband. The
court held that there had been no violation of appellant's due
process rights because the wife's testimony had given appellant
the opportunity to rebut the information. Although the dissenting
judge acknowledged that the information was hearsay, he dis-
sented on other grounds. Thus, the court of appeals tacitly ap-
proved of the use of hearsay at sentencing.
Subsequently, in Scott v. State,4 the court was more explicit
in its approval of the use of hearsay. Scott was a probationer who
had been charged with assault and assault with intent to rape.
At the trial a police officer testified that he had retrieved a cap
dropped by the fleeing assailant at the scene of the crime and that
Scott's mother had identified it as belonging to her son. After this
testimony was excluded as hearsay, the mother denied that the
cap belonged to Scott. Although Scott was acquitted of the
charges, the trial judge nonetheless revoked his probation on the
basis of the officer's testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Pointing to the similarity between the sentencing process and the
probation-revocation process, the court reasoned that, since hear-
say may be used in determining sentence,15 it may likewise be
used in revoking probation.
23. 237 Md. 464, 206 A.2d 812 (1965).
24. 238 Md. 265, 208 A.2d 575 (1965).
25. "In the determination of a proper sentence a judge may utilize information
obtained outside the courtroom, information furnished by those not subject to cross-
examination and sometimes hearsay .... " Id. at 275-76, 208 A.2d at 581, citing Costello
v. State, 237 Md. 464, 206 A.2d 812 (1965) and Driver v. State, 201 Md. 25, 92 A.2d 570
(1952).
Neither Costello nor Driver expressly used the term "hearsay" in discussing the types
of information the sentencing judge may use. As discussed at text accompanying note 23
supra, the Costello majority implicitly approved of the use of hearsay. However, the Driver
case, discussed at text accompanying notes 56-60 infra, involved the use of a presentence
report, which, although its use may contain hearsay dangers, has never been explicitly
labeled "hearsay" in any Maryland cases. In any event, because Driver involved the use
of a presentence report, the statement in Driver that "the judge may consider information
• . . from persons whom the defendant has not been permitted to confront or cross-
examine," 201 Md. at 32, 92 A.2d at 573-74, need not be construed as approving of the
1974
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In Skinker v. State6 the Court of Appeals once again, in
dictum, approved the use of hearsay at sentencing. 7 Thus, if
section 298(f) were enacted in order to relax evidentiary stan-
dards in the sentencing of drug offenders, as the State in the
Nickens case asserted, the statute was unnecessary." Indeed, the
insertion of the reliability language in the statute may have tight-
ened the standards, because prior Maryland cases had not estab-
lished any rule governing the admissibility of hearsay.
THE SENTENCING PROCESS
Two major implications based on the court's reference to due
process" may be drawn from the Nickens decision. The first is
obvious: If the court's holding were compelled not only by the
statutory language but, in addition, by the dictates of due pro-
cess, then the reliability test should be applicable to the sentenc-
ing of all offenders, not simply to that of drug pushers.
A second implication is that information contained in the
presentence report must not be considered unless the report con-
general use of hearsay at sentencing. Additionally, the Scott court's use of the conjunctive
in the passage quoted above suggests that the Costello case was the authority for the "and
sometimes hearsay" portion of the passage: The court apparently drew a distinction
between "information obtained outside the courtroom, . . . furnished by those not subject
to cross-examination"-which, incidentally, looks suspiciously similar to the definition of
hearsay, see MCCORMACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 246 (1972)-and "hear-
say". Therefore, the Costello case, because hearsay was in fact involved, would have been
the appropriate authority to cite.
26. 239 Md. 234, 237, 210 A.2d 716, 717-18 (1965). Skinker had been indicted for
forging and uttering with intent to defraud. He had originally pleaded guilty, but the plea
was subsequently withdrawn. Later, Skinker's counsel filed a motion for a grant of proba-
tion without verdict, see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 641 (1971), which motion was granted.
However, on the basis of information that Skinker had deserted from the Marine Corps,
stolen a tire, and carried a concealed weapon at the time of the theft, the trial judge
revoked his probation and imposed an indeterminate sentence not to exceed four years.
On appeal, Skinker contended that probation was improperly revoked because his
alleged behavior did not violate the terms of his probation-it occurred in D.C., not
Maryland. In addition, Skinker argued that the original grant of probation without verdict
was invalid because improper procedures had been followed. The Court of Appeals noted
that, in determining Skinker's punishment, the trial judge could properly have considered
information, including hearsay, which would have been inadmissible at a trial. However,
the court held that the revocation and subsequent imposition of sentence were invalid
because Skinker had not given written consent, required by section 641, to being given
probation without verdict in the first instance.
27. In Haynes v. State, 19 Md. App. 428, 438, 311 A.2d 822, 828 (1973), decided
subsequent to Nickens, the court held, on the basis of case law, that hearsay may be used
at sentencing.
28. The Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, of which section 298(f) is a
part, was enacted in 1970, subsequent to the decisions in the cases discussed at text
accompanying notes 23-26 supra. See ch. 403, [19701 Md. Laws 881.
29. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
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tains facts supportive of those conclusions. This implication,
less obvious than the first, derives from the following reasoning:
The court's comment regarding due process may have been based
on an awareness that the practice of receiving conclusory infor-
mation from a source which cannot be cross-examined is fraught
with the danger of inaccuracy.3' Without the weapon of cross-
examination, defense counsel cannot test the adequacy of the
factual basis for the source's conclusions nor can he expose the
source's bias or dishonesty. A presentence report, of course, can-
not be cross-examined. Although the preparers of the report may
be presumed to be honest,3" there is, nevertheless, a danger that
the conclusions contained in the report lack an adequate informa-
tional basis.33 It follows, therefore, that the report should contain
the underlying facts from which the conclusions are drawn.3 4
Although the Nickens court did not explain the rationale for
its statement that section 298(f) "mandates the constitutional
protections" of the due process clause, 3 an examination of federal
and Maryland precedent will reveal that the Nickens holding
was, at least arguably, compelled by the requirements of due
process.
30. This conclusion was reached, on constitutional grounds, in United States v.
Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972). The Weston case
and its relationship to Nickens is discussed at text accompanying notes 36-50 infra.
31. See discussion at notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
32. It has been suggested, however, that the preparers of the report are not free of
bias: "Naturally, individual probation officers vary in their willingness and ability to
make recommendations objectively. Consequently, the presentence report may be more
than unfavorable to a defendant; it may actually be prejudicial to him . Steele,
Counsel Can Count in Federal Sentencing, 56 A.B.A.J. 37, 38 (1970).
33. Cf. United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1061 (1972), discussed at text accompanying notes 44-50 infra.
34. Moreover, because the sentencing judge must draw the factual conclusions on
which his decision is based, it would seem improper for the judge blithely to accept the
report's conclusions without attempting to ferret out the factual basis therefor. But cf.
Haynes v. State, 19 Md. App. 428, 311 A.2d 822 (1973), decided subsequent to Nickens.
The appellant in Haynes challenged the trial judge's use of a presentence report
which, in addition to other adverse information, characterized Haynes as a "street person"
who was "the leader of a group composed of individuals with bad reputations and criminal
records." Id. at 435, 311 A.2d at 826. The objection to the report was not, however, framed
in terms of the report's lack of corroborative data. The objection was that the report "was
based in large part upon rumor and hearsay." Id. at 430, 311 A.2d at 824. The court
decided that the information was not rumor and held that, since hearsay may be used in
sentencing, there had been no improper use of the report. The court did not indicate
whether the report contained corroborative information, but it did note the trial judge's
statement that the report was " 'one of the best presentence reports ... I have ever had
occasion to read. It is in great detail .... . Id. at 435, 311 A.2d at 826-27.
35. See note 21 supra.
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Federal Precedent
The federal cases clearly establish the principle that a sen-
tence must not be based on inaccurate information, and one fed-
eral case has held that a sentence must not be based on informa-
tion whose accuracy has not been adequately demonstrated.
The leading federal case involving the use of inaccurate infor-
mation in determining sentence is Townsend v. Burke," Town-
send, while without counsel, had been sentenced on the basis of
materially untrue information or the trial judge's own misreading
of Townsend's record. The Supreme Court held that, because
counsel could have prevented this result, the absence of counsel
violated due process.3 7 Further, the Court asserted that fair play
36. 334 U.S. 736 (1948). After Townsend had pleaded guilty to robbery and burglary,
the following colloquy between Townsend and the trial judge transpired:
'By the Court (addressing Townsend):
'Q. Townsend, how old are you?
'A. 29.
'Q. You have been here before, haven't you?
'A. Yes, sir.
'Q. 1933, larceny of automobile. 1934, larceny of produce. 1930, larceny of bicycle.
1931, entering to steal and larceny. 1938, entering to steal and larceny in
Doylestown. Were you tried up there? No, no. Arrested in Doylestown. That was
up on Germantown Avenue, wasn't it? You robbed a paint store.
'A. No. That was my brother.
'Q. You were tried for it, weren't you?
'A. Yes, but I was not guilty.
'Q. And 1945, this. 1936, entering to steal and larceny, 1350 Ridge Avenue. Is that
your brother, too?
'A. No.
'Q. 1937, receiving stolen goods, a saxophone. What did you want with a saxo-
phone? Didn't hope to play in the prison band then, did you?
'The Court: Ten to twenty in the Penitentiary.'
Id. at 739-40 (emphasis supplied by the Court).
The Court, unimpressed by the trial judge's wit, commented that his "facetiousness
[cast] a somewhat somber reflection on the fairness of the proceeding when we learn from
the record that actually the charge of receiving the stolen saxophone had been dismissed
and the prisoner discharged by the magistrate." Id. at 740. In addition, the Court pointed
out that Townsend had been acquitted of the charges made in 1933 and 1938. Thus,
Townsend, while without counsel, "was either overreached by the prosecution's submis-
sion of misinformation to the court or was prejudiced by the court's own misreading of
the record." Id. This result, according to the Court, "is inconsistent with due process of
law." Id. at 741.
37. There is no doubt that this is the correct reading of the narrow holding.
Townsend was decided before the right to appointed counsel was applied to state criminal
prosecutions. A defendant could, however, demonstrate that, because of the unique cir-
cumstances of his case, the denial of counsel violated due process. See Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455 (1942). See generally Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel and the Rule of
Prejudicial Error, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 855 (1949). The Townsend Court's opinion clearly
indicates that the narrow basis for its holding turned on the prejudicial effect of the
absence of counsel. See discussion at note 36 supra.
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requires that sentence should not be based on inaccurate informa-
tion. Thus, Townsend may be viewed as establishing the princi-
ple that due process is denied when sentence is based on informa-
tion that is inaccurate.
The reliability principle of Townsend was invoked in the
recent case of United States v. Tucker .3 Emphasizing the unreli-
ability of convictions obtained in violation of Gideon v.
Wainwright, the Tucker Court held that such convictions may
not be considered in determining sentence: "As in Townsend v.
Burke, . . . 'this prisoner was sentenced on the basis of assump-
tions concerning his criminal record which were materially un-
true.' ",31
In addition to the Tucker case, recent circuit court cases have
recognized the Townsend reliability principle.' Thus, the propo-
sition that a sentence based on inaccurate information cannot
stand is well established. That this proposition is compelled by
the notion of fundamental fairness is obvious. However, unless
procedures are developed to insure the accuracy of sentencing
information, unfairness may, nonetheless, be the result.
In Williams v. New York, 4 decided subsequent to Townsend,
Subsequently, in Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), the Supreme Court held that
the right to counsel applies to sentencing proceedings. See Pugh & Carver, Due Process
and Sentencing: From Mapp to Mempa to McGautha, 49 TEXAS L. REv. 25, 30 & n.37
(1970); Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARv. L. REv.
821, 833-35 (1968). On the role of counsel in sentencing, see Feit, "Before Sentence is
Pronounced .. ." A Guide to Defense Counsel in the Exercise of his Postconviction
Responsibilities, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 140 (1973); Steele, Counsel Can Count in Federal
Sentencing, 56 A.B.A.J. 37 (1970).
38. 404 U.S. 443 (1971). Tucker, in 1953, had been found guilty of bank robbery. At
the trial, the credibility of his testimony had been impeached by information that he had
previously been convicted of three felonies. After the trial, the judge, giving "explicit
attention to the three previous felony convictions," had sentenced Tucker to 25 years
imprisonment. Id. at 444. Several years later, a California court held that two of the
convictions had been obtained in violation of his right to counsel. The Court commented
that, had the trial judge, in 1953, been aware of the constitutional infirmity of these
convictions, "the factual circumstances of [Tucker's] background would have appeared
in a dramatically different light." Id. at 448. The Court concluded that "[e]rosion of the
Gideon principle can be prevented here only by . .. remanding this case to the trial
court" for resentencing. Id. at 449.
The Tucker case is discussed in Note, Defendant's Right to Protection from Prior
Uncounselled Convictions, 1973 WASH. L. Q. 197.
39. 404 U.S. at 447, citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948).
40. See United States v. Powell, 487 F.2d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Metz, 470 F.2d 1140, 1142 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 919 (1973); United States
v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 634 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972); United
States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809, 816 (2d Cir. 1970). See also Towers v. Director, 16 Md.
App. 678, 681, 299 A.2d 461, 464 (1973).
41. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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the Supreme Court seriously limited the weapons available to
offenders for disproving allegations made against them, and thus
increased the danger of inaccuracy. In Williams, the Court up-
held the imposition of the death penalty following a conviction
for felony-murder. Despite the jury's recommendation for life
imprisonment, the sentencing judge apparently believed that his
decision was compelled by the adverse information contained in
the presentence report. According to the report, Williams had
previously committed thirty burglaries. The report said that he
had confessed to some of these crimes and that witnesses had
identified him as the perpetrator of the others. In addition, the
report charged that Williams possessed a "morbid sexuality. '"42
Williams contended that, because the information was derived
from sources he had not had the opportunity to confront or to
cross-examine, he had been denied due process by the judge's use
of the information.
Justice Black, speaking for the majority, pointed out that
Williams had neither challenged the accuracy of the allegations
nor attempted to refute them. Further, he noted that Williams
had been zealously represented by three lawyers. The Court then
held that an offender is not denied due process when his sen-
tence-even the death penalty-is based on information received
from out-of-court sources that he has not had the opportunity to
confront or to cross-examine.43
Without the right of cross-examination, offenders might find
it difficult to disprove adverse information offered at sentencing.
Thus, a person might be sentenced on the basis of inaccurate
information, but, because he cannot disprove it, he will be denied
relief.
42. Id. at 244.
43. Id. at 251-52. The Court's rationale was apparently grounded on the view that
requiring open court testimony with cross-examination would, perhaps, seriously limit the
sentencing judge's ability to acquire complete information. Obtaining complete informa-
tion, reasoned the Court, is necessary to enable judges to render sentencing decisions
which fit individual offenders, rather than decisions based solely on the nature of the
crime. Because the procedure of requiring open court testimony with cross-examination
"could endlessly delay criminal administration in a retrial of collateral issues, the due
process clause [should not be treated] as a uniform command that courts throughout the
Nation abandon their age-old practice of seeking information from out-of-court sources
to guide their judgment toward a more enlightened and just sentence." Id. at 250-51.
The wisdom of this reasoning is questionable. As one commentator has said: "This
[the Williams emphasis on preserving maximum discretion in the sentencing judge] is a
prime example of the oft repeated error of confusing benevolent purpose with actual or
potential arbitrary outcome." Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative
Ideal: The View from Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 15 (1968).
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A recent federal case, United States v. Weston," illustrates
the danger of inaccuracy that results from the absence of the right
of cross-examination. Relying primarily on information contained
in the presentence report, the trial judge had sentenced Weston
to twenty years imprisonment. The report charged that Weston,
convicted for violating a federal drug statute,45 was the largest
heroin dealer in the western Washington state area. Weston,it
elaborated, made bi-monthly trips to Arizona or Mexico, where
she would purchase $60,000 worth of heroin, a quantity sufficient
to yield a profit of $140,000. Weston vigorously denied this charge
and her attorney observed that she had never displayed "any sign
of wealth."46 Weston could, nevertheless, offer no facts tending to
disprove the allegations. Pointing to this deficiency as well as the
reliability of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs,
which had supplied the information, the trial judge remarked
that he had no alternative but to believe the report. However, he
decided to direct the Government to present corroborative factual
material to be viewed in camera.
Inspection of the material revealed that the allegations were
based primarily on information from an informant who was said
to be reliable. The information was that on one occasion a trip to
Mexico was about to be made, but there was no contention that
the trip actually was made. The informant had also said that
Weston was distributing drugs to one Jackson for delivery to se-
lect customers. Finally, the report stated that the package of
heroin seized from Weston was identical to packages of heroin
and cocaine that were seized from Jackson. After the in camera
inspection the judge refused to reduce the sentence.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, basing
its decision on the reliability principle of Townsend,47 held that
the judge may not consider information from the presentence
report "unless it is amplified by information such as to be persua-
sive of the validity of the charge there made."" The information
44. 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 1061 (1972), noted in 9 Hous.
L. REv. 560 (1972) and 50 N.C. L. REV. 925 (1972).
45. Weston was convicted for "receiving, concealing and facilitating the transporta-
tion of. . . heroin, knowing it had been imported contrary to law." 448 F.2d at 627. This
statute was repealed by Act of Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, title m, § 1101(a)(2),
(4), 84 Stat. 1291. For statutory history, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 171-174 (1970).
46. 448 F.2d at 629.
47. "In Townsend v. Burke, ... the Supreme Court made it clear that a sentence
cannot be predicated on false information. We extend it but little in holding that a
sentence cannot be predicated on information of so little value as that here involved." Id.
at 634.
48. Id.
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offered by the Government was held to be insufficient to corrobor-
ate the "broad charges"49 contained in the report. In answer to the
argument that the defendant had had a chance to refute the
charges, the court pointed to the difficulty of "proving a nega-
tive"50 and placed the burden on the Government to prove the
affirmative.
The Nickens court did not cite Weston, but both cases appar-
ently recognized the danger inherent in permitting the sentencing
judge to receive conclusory information from a source which can-
not be cross-examined. To reduce this danger, both courts re-
quired that such information must be supported by corroborative
facts. Thus, both Weston and Nickens may be viewed as progeny
of Townsend: While Townsend tells us that a sentence must not
be based on information shown to be inaccurate, Weston and
Nickens tell us that a sentence must not be based on information
whose accuracy has not been sufficiently demonstrated.
Maryland Precedent
Prior Maryland sentencing cases emphasize the breadth of
the trial judge's discretion in determining sentence5 and indicate
that his decision is not reviewable.12 However, the cases do recog-
nize an exception to the non-reviewability doctrine when objec-
tions to sentencing procedures are made on due process grounds. 53
The principal due process requirement is that offenders must be
given the opportunity to refute adverse information.54 Addition-
ally, one line of cases indicates that it is also improper for the
judge to consider certain information-referred to in one case as
49. Id. at 630.
50. Id. at 634.
51. See, e.g., Gee v. State, 2 Md. App. 61, 68, 233 A.2d 336, 339-40 (1967).
52. See Duker v. State, 162 Md. 546, 548, 160 A. 279, 280 (1932) (the reasoning of
the trial judge is not reviewable). But see James v. State, 242 Md. 424, 430, 219 A.2d 17,
21 (1966) (sentence not reviewable unless motivated by passion, prejudice, ill-will, or other
unworthy motive) (dictum). James may indicate that there is a limited exception to the
doctrine that appellate courts will not review the substantive aspects of sentencing.
A similar exception has been recognized by some of the federal circuit courts. See
Comment, Present Limitations on Appellate Review of Sentencing-McGee v. United
States, 58 IOWA L. REv. 469, 476 (1972); Note, Daniels v. United States: Appellate Review
of Criminal Sentencing-Limiting the Scope of the Non-Review Doctrine, 33 U. Prr. L.
Rav. 917 (1972).
Maryland law now provides that a defendant who has been sentenced to more than
two years may have his sentence reviewed by a panel of three trial judges. MD. ANN. CODE
art. 26, §§ 132-138 (1973).
53. See, e.g., Turner v. State, 5 Md. App. 584, 593-94, 248 A.2d 801, 807 (1968). See
generally Note, Appellate Review of Sentencing Procedures, 74 YALE L. J. 379 (1964).
54. See Driver v. State, 201 Md. 25, 92 A.2d 570 (1952), discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 56-60.
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"impermissible consideration[s]" 55-despite the defendant's
failure to disprove it.
The leading Maryland sentencing case is Driver v. State.5"
The appellant in Driver had been sentenced to death following
convictions for sodomy and rape. The presentence report stated,
inter alia, that there was a "rumor" 7 that Driver, a black man,
had raped a white woman and had approached a white child. In
discussing the trial judge's discretion, the Court of Appeals said
that he may consider evidence concerning the defendant's "repu-
tation, past offenses, health, habits, mental and moral propensi-
ties, social background and any other matters that a judge ought
to have before him"58 but that information not received in the
defendant's presence must be brought to his attention in order
that he may have opportunity to refute it." The death sentence
was upheld because, although information based on rumor is not
to be considered, the defendant did not object to the contents of
the report, and therefore did not rebut the presumption that the
trial judge has made proper use of the report."0
55. Baker v. State, 3 Md. App. 251, 258, 238 A.2d 561, 566 (1968).
56. 201 Md. 25, 92 A.2d 570 (1952).
57. Id. at 31, 92 A.2d at 573.
58. Id. at 31-32, 92 A.2d at 573.
59. Id. at 32, 92 A.2d at 573. But see Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 275, 208 A.2d 575,
581 (1965), where the court stated that the trial judge may, at his discretion, refuse to
reveal the contents of the presentence report. This raises the question, not explored here,
of whether non-disclosure of the contents of the presentence report is a denial of due
process. For a discussion of this issue, see Pugh & Carver, Due Process and Sentencing:
From Mapp to Mempa to McGautha, 49 TEXAs L. REv. 25, 37-40 (1970); Note, Procedural
Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARV. L. REv. 821, 827-28, 835-41 (1968).
Maryland law now provides that the report "shall be made available" to defense
counsel "upon request." MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 124(b) (Supp. 1973). In Haynes v. State,
19 Md. App. 428, 432, 311 A.2d 822, 824-25 (1973), this provision was interpreted to divest
the trial judge of discretion to refuse disclosure.
60.
We must assume that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Court made
proper use of the report and did not give consideration to anything based only upon
rumor. Therefore, we find no basis for appellant's contention that he was deprived
of due process of law.
201 Md. at 34, 92 A.2d at 574.
Both Costello v. State, 337 Md. 464, 471, 206 A.2d 812, 816 (1965), and Jordan v.
State, 5 Md. App. 520, 528, 248 A.2d 410, 416 (1968), indicate that there is a presumption
that the trial judge has made proper use of the report. This presumption was not men-
tioned in Nickens, but perhaps the presumption was rebutted by the trial judge's denial
of appellant's motion to strike the officer's testimony: The Driver case implies that, had
Driver objected to the report and failed to receive assurance from the judge that he would
not consider the rumor, there would have been some basis for inferring that the judge had
considered the rumor in determining Driver's sentence. Likewise, the trial judge's failure
to grant Rhodes' motion to strike provides a basis for inferring that he had considered the
officer's testimony in determining Rhodes' sentence. Thus, the Nickens court was not at
liberty to assume that the testimony had not been considered.
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Although the Driver case emphasized the trial judge's discre-
tion, it did indicate that a defendant must be given the opportun-
ity to disprove adverse information. In addition, the case implied
that mere rumor is an impermissible consideration, even though
the defendant has been unable to disprove it.
Another impermissible consideration in sentencing, accord-
ing to dictum in Walker v. State,' is an acquittal from a previous
charge. The Walker dictum was reiterated in Purnell v. State;2
the court explained that the rationale for this rule is that prior
acquittals demonstrate that the charges were not well founded.
However, the scope of this exception to the judge's discretion is
limited. The court in Purnell upheld as proper the judge's consid-
eration of the police officers' testimony that the defendant had
admitted to stealing a car and attempting to break into a store,
although no charges had been made.
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Baker v. State3
interpreted Purnell to mean that a judge should not consider
evidence of prior crimes if there have been no convictions nor
admissions by the defendant. The appellant in Baker had been
convicted of committing a burglary. At the trial an investigating
officer had testified that similar burglaries had occurred in the
same area at about the same time. Reading this testimony "be-
tween the lines,"64 the trial judge decided that Baker had com-
61. 186 Md. 440, 443, 47 A.2d 47, 48 (1946). After Walker had been convicted of
attempted rape, the trial judge commented that he recognized Walker and Walker's
brother because " '[t]hey were here in court before me so little time ago,'" but that he
had only a "'vague recollection'" of the incident, which he thought involved a pistol, and
could not remember who had been charged. Id. at 442, 47 A.2d at 48. The prosecutor
remarked: "'I don't know whether your Honor should know about that.' " Id. at 443, 47
A.2d at 48. The trial judge agreed but then indicated that he " 'remember[ed] pretty
much about it.'" Id. Subsequently, the judge imposed the death penalty, despite the
recommendation of two medical experts that Walker should be given life imprisonment.
The Court of Appeals, although noting that "a trial court should not consider mere
charges of which a traverser [had been] acquitted," found that the trial judge had not
done so in the instant case:
[T]he mere fact that a trial court may have had some previous acquaintance with
a traverser, in the course of his judicial duties, would not disqualify him from
hearing a subsequent case. In the instant case, it seems clear that the court did not
recall whether the traverser or his brother had been charged with a previous offense,
the nature of the offense, or the outcome . . . .We find nothing . . . to indicate
any prejudice against the traverser on the part of the trial court, or that any undue
weight was given to the previous court appearance of the traverser.
Id. In addition, the court found no error in the trial judge's refusal to follow the recom-
mendations of the medical experts: "The responsibility for the selection of the penalty
rests upon the trial court, not with the medical experts." Id. at 444-45, 47 A.2d at 49.
62. 241 Md. 582, 584, 217 A.2d 298, 299-300 (1966).
63. 3 Md. App. 251, 257, 238 A.2d 561, 566 (1968).
64. Id. at 256, 238 A.2d at 565.
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mitted the other burglaries. The Court of Special Appeals, com-
menting that the sentence must be based on proper considera-
tions, held that evidence of prior criminal conduct is not properly
considered if there has been no charge, no conviction, and no
admission.
The rationale of the Baker case was suggested by the Court
of Special Appeals in Bryson v. State. 5 Bryson, who had pleaded
guilty to grand larceny, challenged the trial judge's use of infor-
mation that he had previously committed thirty-seven burglaries
and larcenies. According to the prosecutor, Bryson had admitted
these crimes. Bryson relied on Baker in arguing that it was not
proper to consider such allegations without corroboration. The
court felt constrained to distinguish Baker and did so on the
ground that Baker involved a sentence based on the trial judge's
speculation, whereas the judge in the instant case had sentenced
on the basis of facts. 6 This result suggests that information ap-
parently based on fact is not impermissible.
The rationale underlying the cases suggesting of the "imper-
missible considerations" approach seems to be that certain infor-
mation is so inherently unreliable that it should not be considered
in sentencing, despite the defendants inability to refute it. The
Nickens decision may be brought into the "impermissible consid-
erations" rubric by a reading of Nickens that mere conclusory
hearsay may not be considered" 7-an interpretation similar to the
Driver rule that mere rumor may not be considered. However, in
adopting a Spinelli-like test for the admission of hearsay, the
Nickens court went beyond prior cases, since, heretofore, no
Maryland case had set forth a reliability test for sentencing in-
formation.
THE SPINELLI STANDARDS
The Nickens holding requires that the sentencing judge scru-
65. 7 Md. App. 353, 255 A.2d 469 (1969).
66.
In Baker, .... the trial judge speculated that Baker had committed numerous other
crimes for which he had not been caught, but that case can be distinguished in that
the State's Attorney here was merely giving a recital of the facts and stated that
the appellant also admitted that he had committed the other crimes.
Id. at 354, 255 i,.2d at 470. The court did not make clear what other "facts" were being
alluded to. Apparently, the court was referring to Bryson's alleged admission that he had
committed the grand larceny, as well as the other crimes, in order to support his heroin
addiction.
67. Indeed, the Nickens court referred to the officer's testimony as an "impermissi-
ble consideration." 17 Md. App. at 291, 301 A.2d at 53. Thus, although none of the
"impermissible considerations" cases were cited in the opinion, the court apparently
recognized those cases as being kindred.
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tinize hearsay according to standards similar to those required for
establishing probable cause that were set forth in Aguilar v.
Texas"5 and further explicated in Spinelli."9 Such similarity rec-
ommends an analysis of the Aguilar-Spinelli standards and the
appropriateness of applying them in the sentencing context.
In Aguilar, the Court examined a conclusory affidavit, the
salient part of which read as follows: " 'Affiants have received
reliable information from a credible person and do believe that
. . .narcotics . . . are being kept at the above described prem-
ises. . . .'". The Court ruled the affidavit to be constitutionally
defective because it did not contain supporting facts sufficient to
allow the magistrate to make an independent determination of
whether probable cause existed. The majority, speaking through
Justice Goldberg, stated the rule as follows:
Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information
and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the
affiant, . . the magistrate must be informed of some of the
underlying circumstances from which the informant
concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they
were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which
the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity
need not be disclosed, . . . was "credible" or his information
"reliable. "7'
The affidavit scrutinized in Spinelli stated that the FBI
"'has been informed by a confidential reliable informant that
William Spinelli is operating a handbook and accepting wagers
and disseminating wagering information by means of the tele-
phones which have been assigned the numbers WYdown 4-0029
and WY 4-0136.' "72 In addition to the informant's tip the affida-
vit contained information-which, the Government argued, cor-
roborated the tip-regarding the FBI's investigation of Spinelli.
He had been kept under surveillance for five days in August of
1965, and on four of those days he was seen crossing a bridge from
Illinois to St. Louis, Missouri, and parking in the lot used by
68. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
69. The leading Maryland discussion of the Aguilar-Spinelli test is Dawson v.
State, 14 Md. App. 18, 24, 284 A.2d 861, 864 (1971) (Moylan, J., concurring).
70. 378 U.S. at 109 (1964) (footnote omitted). On the basis of this affidavit, a search
warrant had been issued. The ensuing search resulted in the seizure of heroin from Agui-
lar's house. Subsequently, Aguilar was convicted of possession of heroin and sentenced to
20 years imprisonment.
71. Id. at 114 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
72. 393 U.S. at 414.
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residents of an apartment building in St. Louis. On one occasion
he was seen entering a certain apartment. An FBI check revealed
that the apartment contained two telephones, listed in someone
else's name, with the numbers WYdown 4-0029 and WYdown 4-
0136. Finally, the affidavit stated that "'William Spinelli is
known to this affiant and to federal law enforcement agents and
local enforcement agents as a bookmaker, an associate of book-
makers, a gambler, and an associate of gamblers.' ""7
Justice Harlan, delivering the plurality opinion, reiterated
the Aguilar requirements and held that the informant's tip,
standing alone, was inadequate under Aguilar because no under-
lying circumstances had been shown. Next, the Court held that
the affidavit's remaining information did not sufficiently corro-
borate the tip to enable it to pass the Aguilar test. The statement
that Spinelli was a "known" gambler was dismissed as having no
weight since it was a mere bald assertion.74 The investigation of
Spinelli had revealed only "innocent-seeming" 75 activity, and the
information that the apartment had two telephones did not pro-
vide any basis for suspicion since "[miany a householder in-
dulges himself in this petty luxury."7 Finally, the Court held that
the information, taken as a whole, did not establish probable
cause.
In discussing the inadequacy of the affidavit, the Spinelli
Court delineated in a two pronged test the constitutional require-
ments. To pass the first prong of the test, the affidavit must
indicate that the information was acquired in a reliable manner.77
This element will be satisfied if the informant has seen the activ-
ity or been involved in it, has acquired his information from other
reliable informants,7" or has given a description of the criminal
activity in such minute detail that it may be inferred that he
acquired the information in a reliable manner.79 Although the
Court failed to discuss at length the second prong, it indicated
that this aspect of the test is satisfied if the affiant states facts
showing the informant's past credibility.'"
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 416.
78. If the informant has acquired this information in this manner, the inquiry is
focused on the reliability of his source's information and his source's honesty: "Moreover,
if the informant came by the information indirectly, he did not explain why his sources
were reliable." Id.
79. Id.
80. See Id. at 424 (White, J., concurring).
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Although the Aguilar-Spinelli standards have been criticized
as being too technical,"' the basic premise underlying these cases
is very simple: The magistrate, not the affiant, must make the
decision. 2 The affiant's earnest assertion that probable cause ex-
ists is simply not enough. He must state the facts on which his
conclusion is based-including facts concerning his informant's
information and honesty-in order that the magistrate may draw
his own conclusion. The Nickens court seemed to recognize an
identical premise applicable to the sentencing situation: The
judge, not the witness, must draw the conclusions.8 3 Thus, when
a witness gives hearsay testimony, he must recite the content of
his informant's statements and the reasons why the -informant
should be believed.
SPINELLI AND SENTENCING
Section 298(f) states that hearsay evidence may be used in
the sentencing of drug offenders "if the underlying circumstances
upon which it is based and the reliability of the source of the
information is demonstrated. '8 4 Since this language bears strik-
ing resemblance to the language contained in Aguilar and
Spinelli, the appellant in Nickens had a strong argument that the
statute demands the use of identical standards. Refusing to adopt
the Spinelli standards in toto, the court indicated that the show-
ing of credibility need not be as strong as required by Spinelli5
and commented that "the consideration given to hearsay evi-
dence must depend upon the extent of the reliability that is af-
firmatively established on the record.""8
81. See id. at 432-35 (Black, J., dissenting).
82. "[W]e cannot sustain this warrant without diluting important safeguards that
assure that the judgment of a disinterested judicial officer will interpose itself between
the police and the citizenry." Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969).
The Aguilar Court said that its holding was required because "[o]therwise, 'the
inferences from the facts which lead to the complaint' will be drawn not 'by a neutral and
detached magistrate,' as the Constitution requires, but instead, by a police officer...
or, as in this case, by an unidentified informant." Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 115
(1964).
83.
The question of reliability is for the determination of the sentencing judge ....
It may be that a police officer has sufficient training and experience to interpret
the information or corroborate it with his own investigation, but the statements
themselves, as related to the officer or witness, must be recited to the sentencing
judge. It is the specific facts constituting the hearsay, not the witness's conclusion
therefrom, that are admissible to establish informational reliability.
17 Md. App. at 290, 301 A.2d at 52.
84. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 298(f) (1971).
85. See note 22 supra.
86. 17 Md. App. at 290, 301 A.2d at 53. The court's use of the term "reliability"
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The court did not explain its reason for rejecting the strict
application of the Spinelli rule. One possible reason is that the
application of the concept of probable cause to the sentencing
situation would be a doctrinal novelty. The term probable cause
has traditionally been applied only in ex parte determinations of
whether a person has been involved in criminal activity. Sentenc-
ing, on the other hand, is not an ex parte proceeding and the
inquiry is not limited to allegations of criminal activity.
The answer to the doctrinal objections to the use of the
Spinelli test in sentencing is that the test does not require a
determination of probable cause at all. It is merely a tool to insure
reliability when search warrant applications rest on hearsay infor-
mation. Thus, although an affidavit may set forth underlying
facts which enable the magistrate to draw his own conclusion,
these facts may not be sufficient to establish probable cause.
Applied to sentencing, the test could similarly be used to insure
reliability. For example, corroborative facts offered in the instant
case may have convinced the judge that Rhodes was involved in
the criminal enterprise to a significant degree, but may not have
convinced him that Rhodes was the number two man in the or-
ganization.
A second possible reason for the court's reluctance to em-
brace the strict Spinelli rule may have been based on the fear that
such a result would unduly restrict the trial judge's inquiry con-
cerning facts relevant to the determination of a proper sentence.
The sentencing judge's job is not to determine whether each item
of information has been proved to a particular degree of certainty;
instead, he may receive information of varying degrees of reliabil-
ity in order to develop a total picture of each defendant. The court
renders this passage somewhat ambiguous. The passage occurs directly after the state-
ment that the credibility showing need not be as great as in Spinelli. Therefore, the court
might have meant, by the term "reliability," that the weight to be given will depend on
the extent of the showing of credibility. However, if, by saying "reliability," the court
meant to include both the informational basis for the witness's conclusions as well as the
factual basis for crediting the informant's honesty, then the passage might be interpreted
to mean that the judge may consider conclusory hearsay which is supported by only a
scanty informational basis. However, even if the latter interpretation is given to this
passage, the court surely could not have meant that the judge may accept the witness's
conclusions as ultimate facts. Instead, because the court emphasized that the judge must
draw his own conclusions, the passage probably means that, if the witness states facts
which enable the judge to draw a lesser conclusion, he is free to do so. Thus, corroborative
testimony in the instant case may have convinced the judge that, although Rhodes was
not the number two man, he was, nevertheless, something more than a small-time dealer.
In addition, the court's use of the term "on the record" implies that the witness's
corroborative statements must appear on the record in order that a reviewing court can
determine if the test enunciated in Nickens has been satisfied.
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might have believed that it was striking a proper balance between
the need for protecting defendants from unfounded charges and
the need for obtaining complete information.
The answer to this objection is that, if the witness cannot
satisfy the showing of credibility needed for the issuance of a
search warrant, the information should be given no weight in
determining how long a person will be deprived of liberty. When
search warrant applications rest on information from an inform-
ant, the magistrate cannot evaluate his credibility. For this rea-
son, the Supreme Court has demanded at least a minimal demon-
stration of the informant's credibility before a search warrant can
issue. That a search of a person's home is a monumental intrusion
into personal liberty cannot be denied. But it is difficult to con-
ceive of a greater intrusion into personal liberty than the imposi-
tion of a criminal sentence. It is therefore difficult to understand
why an equivalent demonstration of credibility, at the very least,
should not be required when information from an informant is
used in determining whether, and for how long, a person will be
imprisoned.
As a practical matter, however, there may be no difference
between the application of the Spinelli and Nickens credibility
requirements. Because Spinelli does not require a very strong
demonstration of credibility,87 it is likely that almost every dem-
onstration inadequate under Spinelli would likewise be inade-
quate under Nickens.
87. Dawson v. State, 14 Md. App. 18, 284 A.2d 861 (1971), illustrates that only a
slight demonstration of credibility is necessary to satisfy the second prong of Spinelli. The
pertinent parts of the affidavit challenged in Dawson read as follows:
"Information from a ... reliable informant whose reliability has been established
in the past by the arrest of two persons for narcotics and one for burglary that one
Patrick Dawson is dealing Dilaudid from his auto, a Black Ford approximately a
1963 model in the area of Ponca and Eastern Ave. in Baltimore City ....
I [the affiant] have observed this Black 63 Ford in the area of Ponca and
Eastern Ave. in Baltimore City on numerous occasions at approximately nine PM
... I have observed Patrick Dawson in another auto in the area of Ponca and
Eastern Ave. on one occasion. . . . I further observed the Black Ford was listed in
the name of Norma A. Dawson."
Id. at 20-21, 284 A.2d at 862-63. (emphasis added).
Dawson asserted that the credibility prong of Spinelli had not been satisfied. The
court, however, ruled that "the combination of the recitation as to the informant's demon-
strated reliability in the past and the independent,police verification of some of his story
was sufficient" to satisfy this prong. Id. at 22, 284 A.2d at 863.
Judge Moylan, concurring, opined that it was "an extremely close question" whether
the affidavit's recitation of the informant's past credibility was sufficient. Id. at 35, 284
A.2d at 870. However, he concluded that this information had been sufficiently corrobor-
ated to establish credibility: "The verification here was slight, but only slight verification
was required." Id. at 41, 284 A.2d at 873.
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CONCLUSION
Narrowly read, the Nickens case simply interpreted one sec-
tion of a comprehensive drug statute. However, the language con-
tained in Nickens and the relationship that Nickens bears to both
federal and Maryland precedent suggest that this decision may
represent an important step towards insuring an accurate factual
basis for the sentencing decision.
Although it may be desirable to cloak sentencing judges with
discretion to consider various kinds of information without being
constrained by the strict rules of evidence, it is imperative that
they reject information of doubtful reliability. Mere discretion is
not enough; it is informed discretion that must be the backbone
of a rational sentencing policy. Discretion cannot be informed if
exercised on the basis of unreliable information. Therefore,
Nickens should be interpreted broadly in order to insure that only
reliable information is considered in the determination of sen-
tence.
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